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Nowhere does human nature appear less lovable than in
the relations of whole nations to each other. . . . The will
to subjugate another, or encroach upon what belongs to
1
him, is always present.
Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of
2
person.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, “ordinary deaths from
starvation and preventable diseases” amount to approximately 250
3
million people, most of them children. Global poverty refuses to
decline, as global inequality continues to increase, more than
4
doubling since 1960. Thomas Pogge argues that wealthy states
5
This
have a responsibility to help those in severe poverty.
† This paper was presented originally at a “Pogge and His Critics”
conference at the University of Newcastle. My sincere thanks to Peter Jones,
Thomas Pogge, John Tasioulas, and Leif Wenar for comments on earlier drafts.
†† Lecturer of Political Thought, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon
Tyne, United Kingdom, t.brooks@newcastle.ac.uk.
1. IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE OLD SAW: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BUT IT
WON’T WORK IN PRACTICE 312 (John R. Silber ed., E. B. Ashton trans., 1974).
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 3, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
3. THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 98 (2002).
4. Id. at 99–100.
5. Id. at 22–23, 25.

519

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 1
1. BROOKS - RC.DOC

520

3/7/2007 12:37:47 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:2

responsibility arises from the foreseeable and avoidable harm the
6
current global institutional order perpetrates on poor states.
Pogge demands that wealthy states eradicate global poverty, not
merely because they have the resources, but because they share
7
responsibility for its continuation. Thus, for Pogge, global poverty
is more than a wrong imposed on the poor: it is a violation of
human rights and a crime.
In this paper, I aim to demonstrate that Pogge’s conclusions
do not follow from his argument. More specifically, if affluent
states have a negative duty to assist those in severe poverty, their
duty is not absolute because they are not fully responsible for this
poverty. Moreover, if global poverty is one of the greatest crimes
against humanity, then it seems inappropriate at best to support
proposals, pace Pogge, which leave the guilty parties walking free.
We should punish states that cause global poverty.
8

II. THE THRESHOLD CONDITION

Human rights enjoy a particular status amongst more general
rights. States often disagree about what should serve as rights.
Human rights are those rights commonly ascribed to citizens by
most states. Many of these have since become incorporated into
international legal documents.
For example, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights marks out specific rights such as “the
9
right to life, liberty, and security of person.” These particular
rights enjoy a special status, given their endorsement by most states
10
across the globe.
The importance of human rights rests, in part, not only on
their broad acceptance in international and domestic law, but
rather on their ability to enable the enjoyment of a minimally
satisfactory life. That is, following the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, all persons have “the right to life,” no matter their
11
place of residence. This view does not commit us to the position

6. See id. at 201.
7. See id. at 201–03.
8. Pogge does not employ the term “the threshold condition,” although it is
clearly supported by his work, as I will demonstrate in this section.
9. UDHR, supra note 2, art. 3.
10. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc A/CONF.157/23 (July 12,
1993).
11. See UDHR, supra note 2, art. 3.
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that all people must enjoy the same life, but that everyone has the
right to enjoy a certain standard of living, meeting or exceeding a
certain threshold of bare existence. Let us call the right to a life
above this bare minimum the threshold condition. If others prevent us
from meeting or surpassing this threshold, then they both deny the
enjoyment of our basic needs and their act constitutes a human
rights violation. The threshold condition, then, stipulates that a
person suffers a violation of her human rights if she is prevented
from the enjoyment of a basic good. We violate human rights and
12
deny basic needs when we fail to meet the threshold condition.
Thomas Pogge lists several basic needs that require the special
standing of human rights. He says “other, more elementary basic
goods are . . . physical integrity, subsistence supplies (of food and
drink, clothing, shelter, and basic health care), freedom of
movement and action, as well as basic education, and economic
13
participation.”
14
But we need not
This list is not meant to be exhaustive.
attempt to spell out all basic needs. Instead, let us agree with
Pogge that any conception of basic needs satisfying the threshold
condition will include “the right to life, liberty, and security of
person” as found in Article III of the Universal Declaration of
15
Human Rights. Thus, when the enjoyment of basic needs meets
the threshold condition, we can agree with Pogge that social
institutions which ensure “secure access . . . to minimally adequate
shares of all basic goods . . . are, according to my proposed core
16
criterion of basic justice, fully just.”
When the threshold condition is not met, we are denied access
to our most basic needs and our human right to these needs is
violated. The violation of human rights is not something we do to
ourselves, but something others do to us. Specifically, we suffer a
harm in having our rights violated. If we choose to fast and deny
ourselves access to food, our human rights are secure insofar as
12. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 38. Pogge notes that the threshold condition
is not static: “These thresholds will vary for different human rights and for
different sources of threats to one human right . . . . These differentiations have to
be incorporated into the specification of human rights.” Id. at 48.
13. Id. at 49. See THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 33 (1989).
14. Pogge notes that other goods serve as basic needs, such as “liberty of
conscience” and “political participation” amongst many others. See POGGE, supra
note 3, at 48–49.
15. UDHR, supra note 2.
16. Id. at 38.
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food is available to satisfy our basic needs. We may deny
nourishment to the point of causing physical harm to our bodies.
The only variety of harms that count as human rights violations,
however, are those harms inflicted on us by others that deny us the
satisfaction of our basic needs.
When others deny us access to basic needs, such as food, they
violate our human rights by virtue of the harm they impose upon
17
us. One form this violation can take is an institutionally engendered
18
crime. Such a view is best understood by an institutional approach.
The institutional approach highlights the way our institutions
19
contribute to the occurrence of harm. It does not deny that other
20
factors may contribute to harm or human rights violations. Nor
does this view deny responsibility to those who harm others for
their wrongdoing. Instead, Pogge argues that we should judge our
institutions based on how well they protect our basic needs and
21
human rights.
Institutions do not warrant our support if they avoidably
engender foreseeable deprivations of our basic needs. The
institutional approach helps narrow our attention on the problem
of human rights violations in a new way, namely, “[w]e are asked to
be concerned about avoidably unfulfilled human rights not simply
insofar as they exist at all, but only insofar as they are produced by
22
coercive social institutions in whose imposition we are involved.”
Human rights violations occur on an individual level—i.e.,
only individuals can suffer human rights violations—but it is
important not to lose sight of the role institutions may play in
engendering human rights violations and increasing their
likelihood. The utility of the institutional approach is found in its
ability to highlight the ways in which institutional factors impact on
the denial of human rights to individuals. Indeed, Pogge offers a
compelling case that our global institutional order does engender
harm. He readily reminds us of any number of alarming statistics
23
concerning the size and scale of severe global poverty. Our global
17. See generally id. at 47–49 (discussing the violation of basic human rights).
18. See id. at 199.
19. See id. at 49.
20. See id. at 199–204.
21. See Thomas W. Pogge, Liberalism and Global Justice: Hoffmann and Nardin on
Morality in International Affairs, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 67, 70 (1986).
22. POGGE, supra note 3, at 172; Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and
Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 52 (1992).
23. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 2.
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institutional order is thought to not only constitute a structure that
allows for severe poverty, but has also given rise to increasing
political and economic inequalities between affluent and poor
24
countries.
More importantly, our global institutional order does not
merely allow for such deprivation and inequality: it engenders severe
poverty and inequality. Pogge provides countless examples. One
source is international economic bodies, such as the World Trade
Organization, which have enabled the exacerbation of deaths from
global poverty through monetary agreements that favour affluent
25
states at the cost of poor states. A second source is protectionist
exemptions insisted upon by affluent states, which have “had a
huge impact on employment, incomes, economic growth, and tax
revenues in the developing world where many live on the brink of
26
starvation.” A third source concerns what Pogge aptly identifies as
the international resource privilege whereby Third World dictators sell
large swathes of national resources and incur foreboding debts,
enriching themselves at the great expense of the welfare of their
27
people. Potential coup leaders vie for control through civil war in
28
We would remove a
order to take advantage of this privilege.
major incentive for political and economic instability within
countries suffering from severe poverty if we denied the
29
international resource privilege.
In these ways, the global
institutional order contributes to global poverty.
Nowhere does Pogge deny that other factors also contribute to
the existence of global poverty, nor is he committed to the view
30
that the global institutional order is the primary or solitary cause.

24. See id. at 199–201.
25. See id. at 18–19.
26. Id. at 18.
27. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 113–14, 142–43; Thomas W. Pogge, “Assisting”
the Global Poor, in THE ETHICS OF ASSISTANCE 260, 270–72 (Deen K. Chatterjee ed.,
2004); Thomas W. Pogge, Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human
Right of the Global Poor, 18 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L LAW 717, 737–40 (2005); see also PETER
SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 105 (2d ed. 2004).
28. POGGE, supra note 3, at 113–14, 142–43; Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor,
supra note 27, at 270–71; Pogge, Recognized and Violated by International Law, supra
note 27, at 738–39.
29. POGGE, supra note 3, 142–43, 154–55, 162–67; Pogge, Recognized and
Violated by International Law, supra note 27, at 739–40.
30. See Alison M. Jaggar, “Saving Amina”: Global Justice for Women and
Intercultural Dialogue, in REAL WORLD JUSTICE 37, 47–49 (Andreas Follesdal &
Thomas Pogge eds., 2005).
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He recognizes that several other factors may well play a role, too.
Pogge is only committed to the view that the global institutional
order is one contributing factor in the creation and maintenance of
32
global poverty.
Global poverty is a deprivation of basic needs to people
33
without their consent; global poverty is a human rights violation.
34
Affluent states bear responsibility for this state of affairs. Pogge’s
concern is not merely that affluent states support a global
institutional order that engenders poverty. On the contrary, his
concern is that these states bear responsibility for an order that
35
harms poor states in a way that is foreseeable and avoidable. That
is, states are responsible to the degree they cooperate in a global
institutional order that engenders human rights deprivations on
36
the global poor.
Pogge nowhere claims that the global
institutional order is the sole or primary cause of global poverty,
admitting that other factors have relevance as well. It then follows
that, while the global institutional order’s responsibility for global
poverty may be high, it is not absolute: it does not possess full
responsibility for global poverty because it is not the only relevant
37
causal or moral factor for global poverty.
Affluent Western states, thus, share responsibility for global
38
poverty: they do not own complete responsibility. For example,
affluent states share their responsibility with corrupt politicians in
39
the Third World. Pogge offers us a useful example:
Faulting institutional factors for a high murder rate need
not at all exonerate the criminals, nor is denouncing all
murders and murderers tantamount to condoning laxity
31. Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 195,
213–14 (1994).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Pogge, Recognized and Violated by International Law, supra note 27,
at 717–45; Jaggar, supra note 30, at 45, 47–50.
34. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 115 (stating that the international borrowing
privilege helps rulers maintain power and results in countries saddled with debt);
see also id. at 142 (stating that we as citizens of rich countries are implicated by
authorizing our firms to acquire resources from tyrants); see also supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
35. See Thomas W. Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties, 19.1
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 55, 60 (2005); POGGE, supra note 3, at 198.
36. See Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 279.
37. See Pogge, supra note 31, at 213–14 (stating that poverty creates
corruption); POGGE, supra note 3, at 199, 201–04.
38. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 115.
39. See id. at 22.
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of gun control . . . . Even though each and every murderer
is fully accountable for his act, the citizens in a democracy
may also bear an additional collective responsibility for
some fraction of all homicides if these are attributable to
the lack of adequate handgun legislation, for example, or
40
to an unjust distribution of police protection.
Perhaps affluent states are primarily responsible for global
poverty through the global institutional order they impose on poor
states after all. Furthermore, perhaps this order makes it more
likely that corrupt Third World leaders will plunder their own
state’s resources to the detriment of their citizens. The injustice of
the global order may take the lion’s share of the responsibility for
the problem, but this responsibility must be shared with those who
contributed to this injustice.
III. THE GLOBAL HARM PRINCIPLE
If affluent states share responsibility for causing harm to the
global poor, does this warrant any duties of assistance from them?
For Pogge, each of us has a negative duty to refrain from causing
41
unwarranted harm to others. This duty contrasts with a positive
42
duty: the duty to benefit others or prevent harm. Pogge nowhere
denies the importance of positive duty, but instead he limits his
43
focus to negative duty.
When we harm others, we become liable to rectify the damage
we have caused. Mill’s harm principle says “[t]hat the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
44
warrant.” The harm principle holds that we have a negative duty
to refrain from causing harm to others. When “the security of
others” comes under threat, the harm principle demands that we
45
compel those who harm others to refrain from their behaviour.
Preventative measures to end wrongful harm become necessary. In
addition, Mill argues that when someone “has infringed the rules
40.
41.
42.
43.

POGGE, supra note 13, at 31.
See POGGE, supra note 3, at 130.
See id.
See Ser-Min Shei, World Poverty and Moral Responsibility, in REAL WORLD
JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 139, 141–43.
44. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1978) (1859).
45. Id. at 10.
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necessary for the protection of his fellow [citizens],” such persons
46
deserve punishment. If we harm others, then others can justify
preventative measures to redress our wrongdoing. My duty is to
avoid harm to others. But if I am responsible for harming others, I
am under an obligation to correct the damage I have caused.
Another way of stating this point is to say that I do not have an
47
obligation to aid others unless I am responsible for their harm.
Mill’s harm principle is addressed to individuals and is meant
48
to inform their relation to one another. Yet, Pogge’s project is
addressed to members of affluent states with the goal of informing
49
them of how they are responsible for harming the global poor.
We might argue that Pogge, in fact, endorses what we can identify
as the global analogue of the harm principle, that is, a global harm
principle. The global harm principle states the following:
(a) Our state has a negative duty to refrain from causing
harm to other states.
(b) If our state causes harm to other states, then these
states can justify preventive measures to address the
50
wrongdoing our state caused them.
States have a duty to avoid harming other states. But if our
state bears responsibility for harming other states, then we have an
obligation to correct the damage we have caused. That is, we have
a negative duty of assistance to those we harm in virtue of our
responsibility for their harm. We have a negative duty to assist,
justified by our violating the global harm principle. This duty does
not exist simply because others live in severe poverty. We must
bear responsibility for severe poverty in order to ground our
obligation to assist those we have harmed.
Affluent states share responsibility for global poverty. In
imposing coercive global institutional orders, affluent states
engender “associated deaths and deprivations” among the global

46. See id. at 77.
47. We might characterize this position along the lines of Lon Fuller’s
“morality of duty.” LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 6 (rev. ed. 1969). “It
speaks in terms of ‘thou shalt not’ . . . . It does not condemn men for failing to
embrace opportunities for the fullest realization of their powers. Instead, it
condemns them for failing to respect the basic requirements of social living.” Id.
My thanks to Richard Mullender for this suggestion.
48. See MILL, supra note 44, at 9.
49. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 129–30.
50. See id. at 130–34.
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51

poor. The problem is not simply that the global poor suffer severe
deprivation, but rather that they suffer because of the coercive
52
global institutional order. Pogge says “[w]e, the affluent countries
and their citizens, continue to impose a global economic order
under which millions avoidably die each year from poverty-related
causes . . . . We must regard our imposition of the present global
53
order as a grave injustice . . . .” Affluent states are responsible for
a coercive global institutional order that engenders the foreseeable
and avoidable harm of severe poverty. Therefore, affluent states
violate the global harm principle that forbids harm to other states.
As a result, affluent states have a negative duty to assist the global
poor to rectify the harm that they have caused them.
If we have a negative duty to assist those we have harmed, then
our next concern is determining the full extent of the assistance we
owe the global poor. The idea that we can be justifiably penalized
for wrongdoing is not unlike the thought that the guilty deserve
punishment. In fact, Pogge makes several references to global
54
poverty as a “crime.” For Pogge, severe poverty is “the largest,
(though not the gravest) crime against humanity ever
55
committed.” Severe poverty is a crime: it is a violation of human
rights as a deprivation of basic needs. Moreover, it is not mere bad
luck, but rather is engendered by a coercive global institutional
order supported by affluent states to the detriment of the global
poor. Affluent states share responsibility for the harm the global
institutional order helps foster. Their responsibility manifests as a
negative duty to assist the global poor to correct the harm caused
them. This responsibility is not unlike the duty of a criminal to
“pay back” the community for his crime, an idea central to the
56
classical understanding of retributivist punishment.
There is no distinct crime that best captures the variety or scale
of severe poverty perhaps beyond a “crime against humanity.”

51. See Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 279.
52. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 176; Pogge, supra note 22, at 56–57.
53. POGGE, supra note 3, at 109.
54. Id. at 24–26.
55. Thomas Pogge, The First UN Millenium Development Goal: A Cause for
Celebration?, in REAL WORLD JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 317, 334. See Pogge,
“Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 277; Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty
and Human Rights, 19.1 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 2 (2005).
56. See John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238–46
(1979); THOM BROOKS, PUNISHMENT (forthcoming 2008); Thom Brooks, On
Retributivism, http://ssrn.com/abstract=857364.
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Severe poverty contains more harms than simply decreasing life
57
expectancy and causing deaths. Moreover, it affects nearly half
58
the world’s population. Global poverty is more than murder, it is
a crime unto itself. Pogge adopts the view of punishment as
compensation: we must “compensate the global poor” in virtue of
59
the harm we have caused them. First, we must end the harm we
have perpetuated. Pogge recommends we restructure the global
60
order so that we no longer engender harming the global poor.
Thus, we must avoid continuing to abrogate the global harm
principle. Second, our compensation must seek to correct the
61
harm we have generated.
But there are issues that arise in connection with these
suggestions. The first problem is that Pogge’s recommendations
are unsatisfactory because they require more from us than our
negative duties commit us to providing the global poor. The
second problem is that Pogge’s recommendations are
unsatisfactory because they let those who today engender severe
poverty walk free tomorrow without sanction.
Negative duties are tied to the harm we are responsible for
bringing about.
The greater our responsibility for our
wrongdoings, the greater our obligation to rectify the damage we
have caused. Negative duties to assistance only commit us to
eradicating global poverty if we bear full responsibility for it. Yet we
have seen that, while Pogge offers a convincing account that
affluent states share responsibility for engendering global poverty,
he clearly recognizes that other factors contribute to the existence
62
of severe poverty.
Affluent states do not own complete
63
responsibility for the full reality of global poverty.
The lack of complete responsibility is a major problem for
several reasons. The first reason is that Pogge mistakenly believes
his argument for a negative duty to assist commits him to the view
that we have an obligation to eradicate global poverty. For
example, he argues that “[e]ach member of society, according to
57. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 199–201.
58. See Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 265.
59. See id. at 278; POGGE, supra note 3, at 140; Debra Satz, What Do We Owe the
Global Poor?, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 48–50 (2005) (arguing that experts disagree on
the best measures for economic justice).
60. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 9.
61. Id.; see also Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 278.
62. POGGE, supra note 3, at 115–16.
63. Id.; see also Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 268.
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his or her means, is to help bring about and sustain a social and
economic order within which all have secure access to basic
64
necessities.” He is well known for his proposal that if affluent
states gave just one percent of their aggregate global income, then
world poverty would be eradicated—and so we should end world
65
poverty.
While ridding the world of global poverty may be morally
required on any number of grounds, Pogge’s arguments pertaining
to negative duties of assistance do not support such a move. If
affluent states share responsibility for the harm of global poverty,
then surely their duties to assist extend no further than the degree
of responsibility they possess. Affluent states are not wholly
responsible for the engendering of global poverty and, thus, they
are not wholly responsible for eradicating global poverty. They
lack a negative duty to eradicate global poverty. Of course, this still
leaves open a justificatory strategy for arguing that positive duties of
assistance may make up the remainder. But negative duties to assist
cannot support global poverty eradication as the argument stands.
This matter is related to a second problem. We owe
compensation as a form of punishment for our causing harm to
others. Our punishment should be proportional to our crime; our
compensation should be proportional to our responsibility. Pogge
66
demonstrates that we share responsibility for harm. He does not
demonstrate any reliable method for determining how responsible
we are for harm. Of course, any compensation scheme cannot
67
aspire to perfect precision in addressing wrongdoing. But Pogge
faces a real problem in determining our share of compensation.
He says “[t]o be sure, it is next to impossible to quantify the
compensation efforts we owe for contributing to and (especially)
68
profiting from the injustice of the global institutional order.” In
fact, Pogge admits that we are unable to calculate anyone’s
responsibility “even with all the care and information in the

64. POGGE, supra note 3, at 69.
65. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 2, 205; Jaggar, supra note 30, at 50–51; Pogge,
“Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 279–80.
66. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 115.
67. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 245–46 (Allen
W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991); POGGE, supra note
13, at 152 n.54; THOM BROOKS, HEGEL’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A SYSTEMATIC
READING OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (forthcoming 2007).
68. Pogge, supra note 35, at 74.
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69

world.”
If we are unable to discern even a rough guess
concerning the full extent of our responsibility, then we can say no
more than that we should be a party to a compensatory scheme.
We cannot commit ourselves to a view of how much we owe until
we have a view of how responsible we, in our state, are for the harm
we cause.
Now let us consider, too, Pogge’s well known Global Resources
70
Dividend proposal.
He argues that “those who make more
extensive use of our planet’s resources should compensate those
71
who, involuntarily, use very little.”
My worry is that while the
victims of the crime of global poverty may benefit from such a
scheme, those states responsible for the deaths of several million
people from poverty-related causes may walk free and escape
sanction altogether. Those states most responsible for severe
poverty are not required to compensate the global poor at all, but
only if and when they use natural resources. If Pogge’s proposals
were realized, it would be satisfactory for states that violated the
global harm principle to rapidly embrace alternative, renewable
energy resources which would allow these states to avoid making
any contribution to this compensatory scheme. The Global
Resources Dividend is presented as one means by which the
damage caused by affluent states might be addressed, and yet it
allows affluent states to continue to deny existence to the global
poor, or at least those that the affluent states are responsible for
harming. If violation of the global harm principle entails a
negative duty to assist those harmed, the Global Resources
Dividend is a proposal that allows states the opportunity to avoid
honouring their duties to assist the global poor.

69. Id. at 80.
70. See POGGE, supra note 13, at 256 n.18, 264–65; POGGE, supra note 3, at 196–
215; Pogge, supra note 31, at 199–205. For a critique, see Lisa L. Fuller, Poverty
Relief, Global Institutions, and the Problem of Compliance, 2 J. MORAL PHIL. 285, 285–97
(2005); Tim Hayward, Thomas Pogge’s Global Resources Dividend: A Critique and an
Alternative, 2 J. MORAL PHIL. 317, 317–32 (2005); Mathias Risse, How Does the Global
Order Harm the Poor?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 349, 371–75 (2005). The Global
Resources Dividend is not Pogge’s only recommendation for eradicating global
poverty. Pogge also makes a case for a Democracy Panel operated by the United
Nations and financed by a Democracy Fund. See POGGE, supra note 3, at 156–66.
For an alternative argument for “remedial responsibilities,” see David Miller,
Distributing Responsibilities, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 453, 453–71 (2001); and, for its criticism,
see Thom Brooks, Cosmopolitanism and Distributing Responsibilities, 5 CRITICAL REV.
INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 92, 92–97 (2002).
71. POGGE, supra note 3, at 204.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss2/1

12

Brooks: Punishing States That Cause Global Poverty
1. BROOKS - RC.DOC

2007]

3/7/2007 12:37:47 PM

PUNISHING STATES THAT CAUSE GLOBAL POVERTY

531

The existence of global poverty is claimed to be perhaps the
most extensive violation of human rights in our bloodied history.
Severe poverty is highlighted as perhaps the worst and most
72
extensive crime of all time. Yet, it remains a crime that lacks any
punishment for those who bear responsibility for its many evils.
The justice of the Global Resources Dividend is restricted to its
ability to help those least able to help themselves. Its justice does
not extend to an adequate measure for states that engage in
perpetuating global poverty because it only seeks to help victims
without any sanction of offenders nor compensation from them for
their wrongdoing.
Thus, if negative duties require us to
compensate our victims on account of our wrongdoings, then our
negative duty of assistance is a duty of wrongdoers to compensate
their victims. It is possible that outlaw states may either refuse to
participate in Pogge’s scheme or seek renewable energy sources in
an effort to avoid compensating others for past wrongs, not
primarily to decrease environmental degradation. Negative duties
create an obligation on states whenever they cause harm. The
Global Resources Dividend is not a scheme that penalizes those
who harm, but a measure that grants a general amnesty to states
most worthy of compensating victims.
There is something important to be said in favour of
prioritizing the welfare of victims over the punishment of their
perpetrators. Our victims suffer severe deprivations in need of
rectification. The Global Resources Dividend is meant to satisfy the
basic needs of the global poor. Any list of basic needs, however,
will include rights to life and liberty, but also the right that justice
be done and be seen done. Victims of severe poverty may
understandably first desire physical integrity. But bound up in this
right is that those who interfere in the physical integrity of the
global poor must not only refrain from such behaviour, but they
must be held to account for their behaviour. The Global Resources
Dividend perpetuates injustice for the global poor by failing to
provide for the punishment of those who harm the poor.
IV. CONCLUSION
Global poverty is a crime like no other, both more extensive in
the forms of deprivations it can take and in the numbers of people
72. See Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor, supra note 27, at 277; Pogge, supra
note 55, at 2.
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affected. Pogge provides a powerful account of how affluent states
have a negative duty of assistance to the global poor. The global
poor are harmed by a coercive global institutional order. This
order is maintained and supported by affluent states. These states
have a share of responsibility for the plight of the global poor on
account of the support affluent states extend to this global order,
and the foreseeable and avoidable harm this order imposes on the
global poor.
Pogge takes this argument to entail a negative duty to eradicate
global poverty. On the contrary, I have argued his account only
justifies assistance, but not eradication. The affluent states are not
fully responsible for global poverty and, thus, only owe a degree of
assistance equal to the harm caused. Affluent states have a negative
duty to assist, but not to end global poverty, although this view
might be supplanted by arguments in favour of positive duties to
assist that lead to a more complete argument entailing eradication
of global poverty. Pogge, however, does not offer such a picture.
Moreover, not only is Pogge not actually committed to poverty
eradication from his arguments, but neither is he committed to the
Global Resources Dividend for an additional reason. The Global
Resources Dividend may end poverty, but it allows for the guilty to
walk free. If global poverty is the world’s greatest crime, then those
who create the harms that have contributed to the modern crisis of
global poverty are not held liable for any reparations for past
misdeeds. Victims of injustice may well first prefer enjoyment of
basic needs, but one such need is arguably the right to see justice
done. Unless we punish states for causing harm to the global poor,
justice is not fully implemented. Pogge’s recommendations then
do not follow from his arguments, nor do they satisfy a basic
demand of justice.
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